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We analyze the network of relations between parliament members according to their voting behav-
ior. In particular, we examine the emergent community structure with respect to political coalitions
and government alliances. We rely on tools developed in the Complex Network literature to explore
the core of these communities and use their topological features to develop new metrics for party
polarization, internal coalition cohesiveness and government strength. As a case study, we focus
on the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament, for which we are able to characterize the
heterogeneity of the ruling coalition as well as parties specific contributions to the stability of the
government over time. We find sharp contrast in the political debate which surprisingly does not
imply a relevant structure based on establised parties. We take a closer look to changes in the
community structure after parties split up and their effect on the position of single deputies within
communities. Finally, we introduce a way to track the stability of the government coalition over
time that is able to discern the contribution of each member along with the impact of its possible
defection. While our case study relies on the Italian parliament, whose relevance has come into the
international spotlight in the present economic downturn, the methods developed here are entirely
general and can therefore be applied to a multitude of other scenarios.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
A great deal of recent research has been devoted to ex-
plaining political polarization in parliaments [1, 2]. This
literature has been dominated by models where party
polarization is either explained by the polarization of the
electorate or through the party and ideology of deputies.
A new stem of literature has recently adopted tools of
Complex Network Science [3, 4] to investigate this issue,
with a network representation being given to committees
and subcommittees who share the same members in the
US Congress [5], to members of the Congress who co-
sponsor bills [6, 7] or those who place the same roll-call
votes [8]. We follow the latter approach so that deputies
are represented as nodes within a network where the
number of shared roll-call votes determines the strength
of their links. Similarly to [9, 10] we make use of the
network science concept of modularity in order to recon-
struct the community structure of the parliament [11].
We introduce a novel method to characterize the posi-
tion of each deputy in the community of reference, based
on its contribution to the modularity score, proposing a
more intuitive interpretation compared to that based on
the spectral decomposition developed in [10] and in [5].
The method presented here can be easily generalized on
a wider European scale, and replicated across a longer
time span or in industry-specific policies. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. In the “Methods” section
we present the methodology used to investigate parlia-
mentary polarization, party cohesion, community struc-
ture and their time evolution, in the “Results” section
the main findings related to the specific case of the Ital-
ian Parliament are presented, while in the “Discussion”
section we draw our conclusions and sketch the lines of
future research.
II. METHODS
As the first step in our methodology we construct a
graph where each node represents one of the n deputies
and edges are drawn every time two deputies display
the same voting behavior[16]. We then normalize edges
by the total number of votes in the reference period
in order to obtain a weighted graph where weights are
0 ≤ wij ≤ 1. Full weight is given to two deputies i, j
if they participated in all sessions and voted exactly the
same way in all of sessions. When a deputy quits the
parliament, because of incompatibility, resignation etc.,
and his or her seat is taken by a new person, we consider
the two deputies as being just one node[17].
Initially, we look at the topological structure of parties
in order to study their cohesion over time. Completely
ignoring any a priori knowledge of party affiliation, we
look at the communities arising directly from voting be-
havior to see whether they match or not.
Analysis of party cohesion
Consider each party as a subgraph C of the graph G,
with nC being the number of deputies in the party. An
intuitive way of measuring party cohesion (i.e. the ten-
dency of the party to vote as a single entity) is to evaluate
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2the intra-cluster density dint(C) defined as the ratio be-
tween the total internal strength of the sub-graph C and
the number of all possible edges inside that cluster [12]
dint(C) =
∑
ij∈C wij
nc (nc − 1) /2 .
Similarly, we can define the inter-cluster density dext(C)
as the ratio between the observed strength of edges run-
ning from the nodes of C to the rest of the network and
the maximum number of edges connecting internal with
external nodes:
dext(C) =
∑
i∈C,j /∈C wij
nc (n− nc) .
A party stands out as a specific political group if dint(C)
is appreciably larger than the average link density
d(G) =
∑
i,j wij/
n(n−1)
2 of the entire network G and
similarly we expect dext(C) to be appreciably smaller.
Searching for the best tradeoff between a large intra-
cluster density and a small inter-cluster one is indeed
an implicit or explicit goal for most algorithms used in
community detection [11, 12].
Community and core detection
Modularity optimization is a well-established method
for detecting communities [11]. The idea behind modu-
larity is that a random graph should not have a cluster
structure so that communities are revealed maximizing
the difference between the density of edges in a sub-graph
and that expected if edges were connected at random.
Hence the modularity function of a weighted graph [13],
where in our case nodes are deputies and edges repre-
sent the percentage of votes that two of them have in
common, is given by:
Q =
1
2W
∑
i,j
(
Aij − sisj
2W
)
δ (Ci, Cj)
where Aij gives the fraction of similar votes deputies i
and j share in common (Aij = wij), W is the total
weight in the network, δ (Ci, Cj) is a delta function that
yields one if deputies i and j are in the same commu-
nity (Ci = Cj) and 0 otherwise, and si, sj represent the
strength of node i and j respectively.
In the general case of modern democracies the typical re-
sult of the modularity optimization should be the split-
ting of the graph into two communities that reproduces
the government coalition and the opposition.
Moreover each node in its community usually doesn’t
have the same importance for its stability. Indeed, the
removal of a node in the community core should affect
the partition much more than the deletion of a boundary
node. In other terms, some deputies display such a high
degree of internal connections so that they can be iden-
tified as the bulk of the coalition. As we proceed toward
the boundary, deputies display increasing connections to
the opposite community.
In order to investigate this structure, we exploit the prop-
erties of the modularity function following a new proce-
dure introduced in [14]. By definition, if the modularity
associated with a network has been optimized, every per-
turbation of the partition leads to a negative variation of
the modularity dQ < 0.
We compute the effect on the modularity associated with
the shift of a deputy from one community to another and
we plot the corresponding dQ′s distribution in order to
check the coreness of each deputy and his party. In case
of three or more communities dQ was originally devel-
oped in [14] to report the minimum variation in modu-
larity, i.e. modularity was compared against a setup in
which each node was moved, one per time, to its clos-
est community. Here we rather consider movements to
the farthest community in order to avoid abrupt shifts
in the distribution of dQ due to the rise of small tempo-
rary (third) communities. Finally the histogram of the
dQ′s will highlight the different groups that make up the
coalition and will show different sub distributions along
the support interval of dQ.
Measures of Polarization, Cohesion and Stability
Dealing with roll-call vote’s networks as a whole, stan-
dard approaches [8, 10, 15] have adopted the modularity
score as a measure for party polarization. However, our
methodology gives us the possibility to consider the over-
all voting behavior on a much finer scale, considering the
contribution of every single deputy. In line with this, we
have decided to measure the polarization as an average
decrease in the modularity score consequent to the sub-
stitution of two opposite deputies; the larger the decrease
in the modularity score, the larger the current contrapo-
sition between the two coalitions becomes. So we define
the polarization as the sum of the median of the monthly
dQ distributions of the two communities[18].
When we focus on features of only one community, we
still need to account for the community structure of the
whole graph. Think for instance of two time frames in
which the members of the ruling coalition vote exactly
the same while the opposition voted 1/2 and 1/4 of the
time with the government. Then the government dQ dis-
tribution would present more extreme values in the latter
case, determining a shift towards more negative values of
the mass of the entire distribution, despite the cohesion
of the government per se not changing at all. Therefore
any measure of cohesion should be robust to changes in
the location of the distribution. A suitable one is repre-
sented by the interquartile difference of the dQ′s distri-
bution that we will employ as our standard definition for
the party/coalition cohesiveness.
In addition to polarization and cohesion, the stability
3of the government is directly affected by the number of
its loyal deputies; in order for laws to be passed, half
plus one of the total number of deputies are needed in
the Chamber of Deputies. So as a rough rule of thumb,
we can consider a government that keeps up to half plus
one deputies on his side to still be safe. This measure
accounts for the stability of the government comunity in
the shape of a safety zone that divides the last critical
deputy able to break down the majority from the dQ = 0
postion before the oppositon community region.
III. RESULTS
As a concrete case we analyze the network of deputies
in the newly elected Italian Chamber of Deputies (2013).
We collect information on the 630 deputies and their vot-
ing behavior from the government open data SPARQL
endpoint[19]. The reader may refer to table I for an out-
line of the main Italian parties mentioned in this paper.
The available data cover parliamentary votes from April
2013, when the new parliament was appointed, to the
end of December 2013. Despite being quite a short pe-
riod of time, the dataset covers 2820 parliamentary votes,
which implies more than 1,5 million individual votes in
our time span. Importantly, the Italian government has
made semantic data following W3C standards available,
which translates into fast and precise data manipulation
through computer based queries. We refer to this source
of data for the profiles of deputies and the classification
of votes, while data on voting behavior of single deputies
was taken directly from institutional web sites[20].
Figure 1 represents the evolution of density measures over
time for each party in the Italian Chamber of Deputies.
While the structures of the M5S, PD, SEL and LNA par-
ties are recognizable within the graph, the other groups
present inter- and intra-cluster densities that are very
close to each other, or at times even overlapping.
This means that at a certain point their votes propor-
tionally coincide to a greater degree with other groups
than with their own members. The plots marked with a
colored background report the splitting of two political
groups, when the PDL breaks up into the NCD and the
FI in November 2013 and the PI exits from the SCPI
in December 2013. The inter-cluster density, represented
in green, is clearly higher for groups who support the
government (PD, PDL and SCPI). Theoretically these
groups should vote in compliance with the majority’s
prescriptions, thereby showing a similar voting behavior.
Once we take into account the average monthly levels
of edge density d(G) the topological structure of par-
ties becomes very similar to the rest of the graph. As
such, parties may not be the most appropriate represen-
tation of voting structure, thus leading us to consider
the behavioral identification of political groups through
the modularity function. Once applied to the graph of
deputies, the modularity optimization usually splits the
graph into two communities that almost exactly match
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FIG. 1: Members of a party show cohesion if the links
connecting them are stronger than the ties with other
deputies. We capture the former by the intra-cluster den-
sity dint(C) and the latter by the inter-cluster density dext(C).
The party shows high cohesion when the two lie considerably
higher and lower respectively copared to the average link den-
sity of the whole parliament d(C).
the government coalition and the opposition as shown in
figure 2 where the vertical dashed line separates the two
coalitions.
Afterword we compute the effect on the modularity as-
sociated with the removal of a deputy from his commu-
nity computing the corresponding dQ′s and the result is
also shown in figure 2. The histogram shows the dQ′s
distribution of the government’s coalition on the left side
of the dashed line and that of the opposition on the right,
with alle the dQ associated to different parties in differ-
ent colors.
Indeed, the core of the coalition appears to be made up
by a relatively higher share of deputies from the center-
left party PD while relatively more deputies from the
center-right party PDL appear to be at the periphery as
we move to the right. This provides an interesting in-
sight on the rather different roles played by the two main
Italian parties joined by a coalition pact, namely the PD
and the PDL, with the latter ultimately quitting the gov-
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FIG. 2: Community Structure of the Italian Parlia-
ment. The vertical dashed line separates the two main coali-
tions/communities (Government/Opposition). Each coali-
tion comprises different parties corresponding to different col-
ors. The quantity ’dQ’ is associated to the coreness of each
deputy/party. The distributions are obtained computing the
coreness of each deputy and then aggregating them in the
form of a stacked istogram. The more the distance of the bars
from the vertical dashed line, the more the deputies/parties
are at the core of their coalition. Notice how the main par-
ties tend to segregate in clusterd distributions with different
positions in the ’dQ’ axes.
ernment in mid November 2013. As for the opposition,
note that the support of dQ is far more dispersed with
each group taking on a limited range of values in the dis-
tribution. This is not surprising in that the opposition
is not a coalition per se but rather a set of groups that
might vote with the ruling coalition depending on the
subject at hand. In particular, deputies from the M5S
make up the core of the opposition with a higher mag-
nitude of dQ, which also holds true when compared to
the core of the government coalition. This may be due
to a relatively inflexible opposition to the government or
in equal measure to the fact that it is the largest group
in the opposition community. On the other hand, the
SEL and the LNA are progressively closer to the border
of the community, which may be reasonable if we con-
sider that these groups used to be allies of two parties in
the government coalition, namely the PD and the PDL
respectively.
Time evolution of the community structure
The same analysis has been carried out over time, di-
viding votes per month, building up the corresponding
graphs and performing the community and core analy-
sis on each monthly network. In figure 3 the two main
communities present increasingly extreme values of dQ
over time, which in turns provides evidence of increasing
polarization in the parliament.
As outlined in the Methods section we measure the po-
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FIG. 3: The evolution of community structure over
time provides a way to track the cohesion of the gov-
ernment and the overall polarization in the parlia-
ment. The empyrical analog of the cohesion is represented
here by the interquantile difference of the dQ distribution,
where higher cohesion occurs for lower values of the interquan-
tile. On the other hand higher parliament polarization is cap-
tured by the distance between the two medians. Finally the
safety zone that divides the last critical deputy able to break
down the majority from the vertical dashed line (dQ = 0) is
represented in green.
larization as the sum of the median of the monthly dQ
distributions of the two communities. In this respect,
December noticeably stands out, with a reduction in the
extreme values of dQ for the opposition. This is actu-
ally driven by the fragmentation of the PDL, which wit-
nessed its deputies loyal to the leader Silvio Berlusconi,
withdraw their support of the government and start to
5vote with the opposition to the point of being identified
as part of it.
This figure 3 illustrates also the cohesion, or rather its
flip side: the heterogeneity of deputies within a single
community.
In the same figure 3 we have represented the government
stability through a green safety zone corresponding to
values of dQ smaller (in absolute value) than the monthly
critical value dQcritical. In the specific case of the Italian
Parliament the Chamber of Deputies has 630 represen-
tatives and the critical value will correspond to the dQ
relative to the 316th deputy. If the government loses this
deputy will be in trouble otherwise will remain still in
the safe zone.
With fixed levels of polarization and cohesion, the
wider this zone is, the safer the government is in that
month, as it would be able to retain the withdrawal of
core deputies proportionally the the stregth required to
move the 316th deputy to the other side.
Having investigated the peculiar structure of the govern-
ment coalition, we focus on a political party that may
be partly responsible for the variability of the coalitions
topology over time. Indeed the PDL, after a long de-
bate regarding whether to support the government or
not, eventually split into two different parties. After the
split in mid November, deputies from the FI moved into
the opposition community. However, surprisingly, those
who left moved from the core of the government to rel-
atively core positions in the opposition, as reported in
figure 4.
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FIG. 4: The position of single deputies within com-
munities provides insights on what happens when a
party splits up. In this particular case the PDL party in
mid November 2013 splits into two different parties ’Forza
Italia’ and ’Nuovo Centrodestra’. Interestigly, nodes at the
core of the government coalition become core in the opposi-
tion one when the split up occurs. This is evidence of political
voting being driven by coalitions’ affilitions rather than the
policy content of each roll call vote.
This dynamic may somehow explain the peculiar drop
of the polarization observed in December in figure 3, as
the FI group switched voting behavior to such a degree as
to be recognized as part of the opposition, simultaneously
reducing the contraposition between the two communi-
ties.
IV. DISCUSSION
The study of the consensus dynamics in modern parlia-
mentary democracies is of great importance for the vali-
dation by citizens of the performance of their representa-
tives. These dynamics are often hidden by complicated
voting procedures that prevent the easy identification of
these civil representatives. We need new ways to look
at the details of the political activities, which go beyond
the standard statistical indicators, ways that are able to
reveal the dynamics of the general organization of the
government, its opposition and even their internal struc-
tures, in a format that is intelligible to non-expert users.
In this study we introduced a novel procedure to map
parliamentary voting trends onto a network structure in
which the nodes are the deputies and the edge weights
are the strength of their relations. These weights, month
by month, quantitatively measure the degree of closeness
between couples of deputies as the number of votes they
shared in a specific time frame. Once this network has
been built up, using Community Detection techniques
borrowed from Complex Network Science, it is possible
to reconstruct the main coalitions, the government and
the opposition from the bottom up; through a ‘Core De-
tection’ analysis it is also possible to uncover the inter-
nal structure of these aggregations. Using the leverage of
later analyses we were able to quantitatively detect the
position of each party, the strength and consistency in
its coalition and the level of polarization between gov-
ernment and opposition.
Furthermore, the Open Data movements around the
world are pushing public administrations to provide free
and open access to massive amounts of data, which can
be used by citizens and companies as a starting point for
the detailed analysis of public policies. In this study, we
relied on a recent service introduced by the Italian par-
liament that allows the automated extraction of certified
information about the votes of the Chamber of Deputies.
Through this service we have been able to perform a thor-
ough analysis of the dynamics of the Italian parliamen-
tary factions over nearly a year of legislation, using the
aforementioned methodology.
These methods open up new possibilities of bringing cit-
izens closer to their representatives, thereby establishing
the foundations for a more transparent democracy.
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TABLE I: Outline of the main Italian parties
Party Coalition %∗ Notes
Partito Democratico (PD) Gov 46, 5% Main center-left party, historically lead by Prodi
Il Popolo della Liberta` (PDL) Gov/Opp 15, 2% Main conservative party, lead by Berlusconi
Forza Italia (FI) Opp 10, 6% From PDL split, founded and lead by Berlusconi
Nuovo Centro Destra (NCD) Gov 4, 6% From PDL split, lead by Alfano
Scelta Civica (SC) Gov 7, 3% Lead by Monti, PM for one year after 2011 crisis
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) Opp 16, 3% Lead by comedian Grillo, form of direct democracy
Sinistra-Ecologia-Liberta` (SEL) Opp 5, 6% Left party, former ally of PD
Lega Nord (LN) Opp 3, 2% Autonomist party of Northern Italy, former ally of PDL
∗ Shares updated to may 2014, smaller parties omitted.
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